This paper discusses the impact of deregulation and market integration policies on the structure of European banking markets. The paper argues that whether European integration will lead to an increased exploitation of scale advantages, or not, will depend on the extent to which competition in banking is based on fixed or variable costs. If competition focuses on variable costs, concentration will diminish with market enlargement when we control for the pro-concentration effect triggered by the deregulation process. Alternatively, when competition focuses on expenses unrelated to the level of intermediation, concentration will not tend to decline as the size of the market grows. This is due to the compensating effect of increased competition in fixed costs such as brand image or electronic banking.
Introduction
The European banking industry has gone through a process of integration, which reached its peak with the adoption of the single currency in 1999. The completion of the single market for banking has involved the implementation of EU regulations aimed at opening domestic markets and partially harmonising national banking systems. Most importantly, however, it has triggered in many countries the adoption of domestic deregulation programs that have drastically changed the competitive regime. This paper looks at the consequences of this joint process of deregulation and market integration on the structure of European banking markets.
Section 2 characterises the completion of the integrated European banking market. The paper highlights the key deregulation and market opening policies and constructs country-level indicators that capture the different pace and extent to which EU member states have opened their borders, deregulated the domestic market and adopted the harmonised regulatory regime. Whether EU member state banking markets become a single EU-wide market will depend on the importance of entry barriers set up by incumbents and on the presence of unexploited scale and scope economies in the industry. These issues are discussed in Section 3. The paper argues that if entry barriers are not too high, the characteristics in terms of seller concentration of the resulting equilibrium with market integration will depend on the nature of competition in banking. Following Sutton (1991) and Schmalensee (1992) , I argue that European banking markets will become moderately concentrated if banks engage in competition through standard strategic variables such as price or customer service. Concentration at the national, and particularly at the EU level, is likely to increase substantially, however, if competition focuses on cost items such as the development of a brand image or the investment in electronic banking. Section 4 provides an exploratory empirical analysis at the European level aimed at characterising the nature of banking competition during the period 1981-95. The parameter estimates suggest that banking competition in Europe appears to be focusing mostly on variable costs. If this type of competition continues to predominate in the future, we would expect a process of national concentration without generating in the medium term a significant increase of EU-wide concentration. A concluding section summarises the main results of the paper.
Regulatory change in European banking
Regulatory interventions in banking have been pervasive for many years and adopt many forms.
This section assesses regulatory changes in European banking markets from the point of view of their impact on the competitive conditions in EU markets and the extent of market integration.
Deregulation, integration and market structure in European banking
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We will distinguish three types of regulations (1) depending on their effect on domestic competition, the potential for exploitation of scale and scope economies and the external competitive position of banks (see Table 1 ). European banking has undergone a profound process of deregulation, with changes in the three categories of regulatory interventions. Only part of this process has been driven directly by EU legislation. Let us consider the different types of regulations in turn.
Regulations that soften domestic competition
Consider, first, the regulations that stifle the development of a domestic competitive environment and tend to support regimes of (implicit) collusion. This has been traditionally the consequence of restrictions on the entry of new domestic firms, or limitations to the free deployment of competitive tools by firms (measures such as interest rates and fee controls) (2). Further dampening of competitive rivalry results from controls to capital flows that limit competition from foreign suppliers, particularly in wholesale markets where cross-border activities are easiest. Capital flow controls for these countries refer to restrictions on investments and loans with foreign institutions.
For the rest, the data cor respond to full liberalisation.
In many member states the changes in the competitive environment have been the result of a domestic policy of a gradual lifting of restrictions on interest rates, credit controls and (in some cases) entry of new banks. In some countries the elimination of these restrictions is better understood, however, as a pre-emptive move in the wake of EU integration policy. Table 2 provides a summary of the key liberalisation dates and shows that there are significant differences across countries.
In fact, some of these dates underestimate the pace of liberalisation since they correspond to the liberalisation of all rates and many countries started the liberalisation process earlier (i.e. France liberalised fees in 1986, and Spain and Portugal started the liberalisation of interest rates in the late 1980s). has also a significant impact on domestic competitive conditions. This is discussed further below. Similarly, even if the SBD sets a list of activities which are covered by the single passport, there is still some scope for differences across countries in terms of the kind of activities that may be pursued by banks in non-bank financial markets such as insurance and securities (see Table 3 ).
Continental Europe usually adopts a universal banking approach. By granting a single passport, the SBD provides an incentive (and a focal point) for harmonisation. However, the SBD does not include insurance activities. Overall, differences across countries persist. However, they do not appear to be of practical significance compared with the differences relative to other OECD countries (such as the US and Japan) and they are unlikely to constitute a source of competitive advantage for banks facing a less restrictive regime.
Regulations that alter the external competitive position of banks
The third category of regulatory intervention includes several measures that influence the cost of funds and, as a consequence, the external competitive position of domestic banks. Prudential regulations such as solvency and own fund requirements, limits on large exposures, and regulations regarding participation in non-financial firms or activities in real estate, would fall under this heading. These prudential measures tend to impose restrictive equity requirements and raise the cost of doing business for financial intermediaries. Similarly, regulatory interventions that impose restrictions on banks' investments (i.e. reserve or investment coefficients) produce an equivalent result to the extent that they limit the free use of deposits and own funds. These coefficients, however, have often been imposed together with the controls on deposit rates mentioned above, usually with 
3) By and large, member states that had important specialised institutions have reduced the segmentation of the domestic
industry (i.e. France in 1984 , Italy in 1993 , the UK in 1985 , Spain in 1991 , Sweden in 1987 .
Volume 4 No 2 1999 39 EIB Papers a compensating effect on the cost of funds. Regulations referring to deposit insurance may also be included to the extent that banks operating under standard insurance regimes enjoy lower costs of funds. Government protection diminishes the incentives of banks to maintain a large capital base and thus diminishes costs. Many EU regulations have been devoted to harmonising prudential requirements. The objective has been to create a level playing field by imposing minimum standards on regulations, which, on the grounds of solvency and stability, impose costs on domestic banks. The EU directives include legislation on solvency ratios, the definition of own funds, large exposures and others. Table 4 summarises the pace of adoption of these legislation by EU member states. The EU standards constitute only a lower bound on prudential requirements and several countries have adopted legislation, which is even more stringent. As for reserve and investment coefficients, many of the countries with significant interventions dismantled them in the late 1980s and early 1990s (France in 1987 , Portugal in 1994 and Spain gradually up to 1992 . Nevertheless, some differences remained across countries with regard to the reserve coefficient, coexisting countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK where the coefficient was almost nil, with others, where by 1995 the level was still comparatively important (i.e. Germany and, in particular, Italy).
Put together, the information summarised in Tables 2 to 4 will be used to construct a summary index of deregulation for each member state for the period from 1981 to 1995 inclusive. 
The integration of banking markets
The economic literature on market integration (4) shows that in conditions of imperfect competition there is a wide range of factors which determine the degree of integration of previously segmented markets and the structure of the resulting market.
First of all, the size of transport/transaction costs may segment markets naturally. Secondly, there may be significant economic or legal barriers that prevent entry into new markets. Finally, there is the extent of the economies of scale (and scope) which can be obtained by serving the whole integrated economic area.
4) See Baldwin and Venables (1995).
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Differentiation and barriers to entry in banking
The establishing of a legally integrated European banking market and the introduction of the euro does not necessarily mean in practice that a single market is created. First of all, in spite of advances in financial service provision with no need for physical proximity, there are still high "transport costs" in retail banking and this means that entry into foreign markets must be based largely on the opening (or acquisition) of a branch network. Furthermore, even though horizontal differentiation is hard to achieve in banking (financial products are easily imitated), this is not incompatible with strong preferences for domestic service providers, based on perceived superior quality. These preferences may lead to foreign competitors having only a very small share of local markets. Indeed, a factor favouring local banks, especially the largest of them, is the reputation associated with size. In banking perceived quality is often associated with perceived safety and low risk levels, and this may come from size insofar as this permits a diversification in loan investment and can even lead to expectations of intervention by regulatory bodies in any hypothetical insolvency. In fact it is difficult empirically to distinguish between this possibility and the impact of non-legal barriers to entry. These barriers are sometimes inherent to the deployment of banking activities, but may also be the outcome of strategic behaviour (5).
One of the key intrinsic features of banking that favours incumbents is the advantage in terms of i n f o rmation enjoyed by local banks. Dell'Ariccia (1998) shows that informational asymmetry hinders the entry of banks into new markets even when legal restrictions on entry are lifted. In more inform a l t e rms, knowledge of the local market and information held by banks about their customers (e.g. i n f o rmation on transaction deposits at the time of granting loans) can give significant advantages.
A second source of incumbent advantage and a potential entry barrier is the widespread network of branch offices owned by the leading domestic banks. Although these networks are not, strictly speaking, an irrevocable commitment to market presence (they are not, therefore, a strategic barrier to entry), they do provide a formidable position of established capacity on the market, and may deter entry.
A third factor is the existence of switching costs. Banking usually involves a long-lasting contractual relationship in which, from the customer's viewpoint, any change involves considerable cost: deposit holders attempt to make their current financial decisions compatible with their investments in contractual relationships established in the past (6).
Finally, it is well known that there can be political obstacles to the entry of foreign banks via takeovers, given the role played by banks in payment systems and the financial system in general (7).
How do banks compete?
The consequences of European integration for the structure of banking markets within member states and at EU level will be determined by the characteristics of the economies of scale in the industry and by the nature of bank customers' preferences. Vives (1991) , and Gual and Neven (1993) . 6) Klemperer (1992) . First of all let us consider a situation in which banks compete on prices or unit costs. This would make banking an activity in which firms compete for market share by means of a variable expense, closely linked to their level of intermediation. This alternative covers both competition through higher interest rates on deposits (or lower interest rates on loans) as well as strategies based on improving customer service. In this last case market share is increased by committing more resources (for example, more qualified personnel) per customer or per unit of assets or liabilities intermediated.
5) See

7) ERE (1996) mention the "general good" clause as a potential source of legal constraints within the EU to entry by institutions from other EU member states.
It must also be observed that competition through services which improve access to the bank by clients (e.g. branch offices and ATM) is a similar strategy, in that the fixed costs associated with a branch office (or a cash dispenser) are quickly exhausted in relation to market size. The number of branches and cash dispensers (and their cost) grows along with the level of intermediation of the bank. From an equivalent viewpoint, this is a type of expenditure, which ceases to be effective in gaining market share at comparatively low levels (having two branches close to home rather than one is unlikely to modify the customer's willingness to pay).
Consider next, an alternative view of banking, even though it is not necessarily incompatible with the previous one. Suppose banking involves activities in which capturing market share (or incre a s i n g the willingness of consumers to pay) is achieved by committing (non recoverable or sunk) expenses which are fixed, that is, unrelated to the volume of operations or intermediation of the bank.
There are many examples of potentially relevant fixed expenses of this type: the development of a commercial brand or image, software for Internet banking or back-office operations, etc. In these cases the expense involved does not depend on the number of customers or the volume of operations of the bank, but it affects the company's ability to compete. Using the terminology of Sutton (1991) these are endogenous sunk costs. These must be distinguished from conventional fixed costs (which Sutton refers to as exogenous) which generate economies of scale but do not affect the bank's ability to increase its market share (branch offices constitute a typical exogenous fixed cost in banking). These latter costs can be recouped (in full or in part) if the project is abandoned.
Gual (1999) develops a simple model of bank competition to analyse the implications of the nature of competition on the equilibrium structure of the market in a model with free entry. As in Sutton (1991) and Schmalensee (1992) , the results show that the impact of market growth on structure (summed up by an index of firm concentration) depends crucially on how companies compete. If competition is based on variable costs, the market tends to fragment as its size increases. At the opposite extreme, if rivalry is centred on endogenous sunk costs there is a downward limit and concentration is not necessarily reduced when the market grows due to the impact of increased competition.
Indeed, the formal analysis shows how the effect of market size on concentration will depend on the degree of rivalry and the nature of competition. On the one hand, concentration goes down with an increase in market size and it goes up with higher competition, irrespective of the nature of competition. On the other hand, a key difference between the two cases is how the effect of market size on the level of concentration changes with higher levels of competition. With variable If the sunk cost competition model dominates there will be a strong trend towards pan-European concentration in the coming years. If, however, the variable cost model is more relevant the increases in concentration (which have already taken place in part) will be less significant and may reflect the adjustment, at the member state level, to a higher level of domestic rivalry. In this instance, EU-wide concentration will remain low.
Empirical analysis
These hypotheses can be tested with market data. The following specification provides a simple setup, which nests the two alternative models under examination:
where C O is a concentration variable, S is a market size variable (such as total assets or revenue), C is a competition variable and v is an error term. The subscripts i and t refer to countries and years for which observations are available.
If banking competition takes place fundamentally on variable costs, the concentration index should be correlated negatively with market size and positively with the level of competition in a sample of countries with time series data. In terms of coefficients this means that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0.
Furthermore, as derived from the theoretical model, the level of competition would be expected to affect the impact of market expansion on concentration. In general, the higher the level of competition, the greater the effect of an increase in market size on the decline in concentration. In terms of parameters this means that 3 < 0. This parameter restriction is, of course, also valid for changes in the level of competition, so that increases in concentration entailed by greater competition are less important in larger markets.
If competition is based on fixed costs, an increase in competition entails as before an increase in concentration and 2 > 0. The relationship between concentration and market size is also negative or 1 < 0. However, unlike the case of competition on variable costs, the combined impact of the variables is positive in this case and 3 > 0. For instance, the greater the level of competition, the smaller the negative effect of an increase in market size on concentration.
Due to insufficient information on deregulation changes, the empirical analysis was performed with data for eleven European Union countries. All years between 1981 and 1995 are included, with a total of 165 observations. Two indices of competition, C A and C C have been constructed from the information in Section 2. This is explained in more detail in the Box. The econometric analysis allows the intersection term to differ from one country to another, introducing a fixed effect. This will capture differences in concentration levels between countries, which are not explained by the explanatory variables used in the regressions. Table 5 provides a summary of the results, and shows the re g ressions perf o rmed using both ord i n a ry least squares and least square dummy variables or fixed effects. The estimation was carried out under the alternative hypothesis of random effects. F-tests were run to check for fixed effects associated with the diff e rent periods considered in the sample, but it was decided not to include them (8).
F u rt h e rm o re, the re g ressions at the country level do not seem to indicate problems of autocorre l a t i o n .
The random effects model is there f o re taken into account only for a random effect associated with each cross sectional unit. For this model the estimate of the pro p o rtion of total variance associated with this effect is very high, so the model resulting from estimation with generalised least square s should in principle be very similar to the model estimated with fixed eff e c t s .
Altogether the results provide an estimated value for the market size parameter, 1 , of -0.30, and for 2 , the competition variable parameter, a positive value of 0.25. Both parameters have the signs and magnitudes expected in the most suitable estimation, which seems to be the one including fixed country effects and the cumulative deregulation variable as a measurement of the level of competition (marked in bold in the Table) . Parameter 3 is negative in most specifications (between -0.01 and -0.03) and although it is not always statistically significant, it is, as expected, clearly lower in magnitude than parameter 2 .
In summary, from the sample analysed, we cannot rule out the hypothesis of competition on variable costs in the banking sector. (K-1, N-K-1) . This alternative is therefore clearly rejected. 
Concentration
The concentration variable is based on a standard concentration ratio (C 5) constructed as the percentage of assets at year-end corresponding to the top five banks in each banking system. 1 n C O is the logit transformation of C 5 so that it does not take values between 0 and 1. Thus:
The data on total assets comes from the Bank Profitability database of the OECD. Data on the leading banks was collected from The Banker.
Market size
Market size is measured by the total assets of the banking industry in constant dollars. Two observations must be made at this point. First of all, as derived from the model, the relevant variable is market size in relation to the fixed exogenous establishment costs. We shall assume that these are the same for all markets and do not change over time. Secondly, the theoretical model shows that market size depends on the level of interest rates (in the model the inter-bank debt or public debt rate which segments the loan and deposits markets). Therefore, we shall use two alternative variables to measure market size.
The first is total assets and the second is assets times the interest rate, which is a revenue measure.
Competition
The competition variable C is proxied with a variable, which shows the degree of deregulation of the 
Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the impact of deregulation and market integration policies on the structure of European banking markets. The analysis focuses on the effect of market enlargement on concentration ratios taking into account the competition effects of changes in the regulatory regime.
Following the theoretical distinction established by Sutton (1991) and Schmalensee (1992) , this paper argues that whether European integration will lead to an increased exploitation of scale advantages or not will depend on the extent to which competition in banking is based on sunk costs or variable costs. If competition focuses on variable costs, concentration will diminish with market e n l a rgement, when we control for the pro-concentration effect triggered by the deregulation pro c e s s .
Alternatively, when competition focuses on expenses unrelated to the level of intermediation, concentration will not tend to decline as the size of the market grows. This is due to the compensating effect of increased competition in fixed costs such as brand image or electronic banking.
F i n a l l y, I propose a simple test that using aggregate data provides an empirical assessment of the dominant form of competition. The application of this pro c e d u re to data for eleven EU countries during the period 1981-1995 yields parameter estimates which indicate that, over the period of analysis, competition in Europe tended to be predominantly based on variable costs. On this basis, one would not expect large increases in European banking concentration as a result of market integration (EU14 concentration in 1995 was about 11%, way below the 22% for Japan, and the 19% seen in the US), and we would expect consolidation only at the level of some domestic markets.
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The data set used in this paper does not allow a test of the extent to which the form of competition may have changed over time and further research should explore this possibility. Past competition may have been based on variable costs, but this could be a poor guide to future competitive conditions. Moreover, the model focuses on retail activities, even if most large European deposittaking institutions should be classified as universal banks. There is some uncertainty about the nature of competition in retail banking, but little doubt that corporate and investment banking compete in a global market and are subject to substantial increasing returns. These structural features of wholesale and investment banking tend to foster global concentration.
To the extent that large European banks engage in wholesale banking, the key determinants of market structure in this industry may reinforce the trend towards fixed-cost competition between large commercial banks. This could result in a dichotomic European market structure where large pan-European banks coexist with geographically focused and specialised institutions. This tendency could also be reinforced by the growing competition from non-bank institutions. Widening capital markets with the advent of the euro will facilitate entry and thus promote both the growth of the capital markets activities of universal banks and the appearance of smaller institutions specialising in capital market intermediation. 
